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Abstract
We consider a dual economy consisting of a traditional sector and a modern sector. Each sector
uses sector-speciﬁc skill, which is accumulated through work experience. There is exogenous pro-
ductivity growth only in the modern sector, which has an attractive force of shifting people toward
the modern sector. However, the transition to the exclusive use of the modern sector technology
occurs gradually, because experience and labor are complements within each sector. During tran-
sition, aggregate output follows a S-shaped path, eventually converging to the productivity growth
of the modern sector. Using micro data from Thailand, Socio-Economic Survey, for 1976-1996, we
partition the economy into traditional and modern sectors and estimate the deep parameters of
the model, explicitly measuring the size of the sector-speciﬁc complementarity. We then simulate
the model at the estimated parameters and report on the success of the model in explaining the
dynamics of (i) average labor earnings, (ii) sectoral transition, (iii) inter-sectoral earnings inequality
and (iv) intra-sectoral earnings inequality.
JEL: O11, O47, J31, O15
Keywords: Modern Transition, Sector-Speciﬁc Complementarity, TFP and Inequality Dynamics
∗Please, do not quote or cite without authors’s permission.
†Department of Economics, University of Southern California. Corresponding Emails: hjeong@usc.edu;
yongkim@usc.edu.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper argues that a model of transition can provide a useful theory of both why modern industri-
alization occurs at diﬀerent times and why it proceeds slowly. An existing literature has argued that
the proximate cause of the observed disparity in income levels across countries is that today’s poor
countries began the process of industrialization much later, and that this process is slow, e.g. Lucas
(2000), Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2002), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Ngai (2003) and Parente
and Prescott (2004). This literature has mainly considered a transition from agricultural to non-
agricultural technologies where the timing and speed of industrialization is explained by the built-in
exogenous barriers and/or exogenous productivity growth diﬀerentials between the two sectors.
In this paper, we focus on the transition from traditional to modern technologies, which does not
necessarily coincide with, though is related to, the sectoral shifts from agriculture to non-agriculture.
The modern sector is identiﬁed with a group of people who beneﬁt from exogenous productivity growth,
regardless where they live and also regardless whether they work in agriculture or non-agriculture.
There are three main ways to partition a transition economy under structural transformation:
(i) agriculture versus non-agriculture, (ii) rural versus urban, and (iii) traditional versus modern.
Kuznets (1955) postulated a relationship between growth and inequality emphasizing the population
shifts from agriculture to non-agriculture. Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2002) provide an updated
discussion, focusing on cross-country diﬀerences in income levels. Todaro (1969) is an early treatment
of transition and labor productivity via rural-urban migration. Lucas (2004) provides an updated
discussion.
This paper is closest to the third strand of dual-economy models, featuring transition as a popu-
lation shift from traditional to modern sector, pioneered by Lewis (1954) and Ranis and Fei (1961).
In contrast to their original assumptions of the existence of unlimited surplus labor and an imposed
inter-sectoral gap in marginal productivity of labor, we consider all inputs to be priced at competitive
margins in both traditional and modern sectors. Despite this, we can still generate take-oﬀ transition
dynamics, which are the typical feature of conventional dual-economy models.
Our model introduces sector-speciﬁc skills that can be accumulated from work experience and
complement labor within each sector. As in Chari and Hopenhayn (1991), entry into the more pro-
ductive modern sector by young agents who supply labor, is limited by the stock of old agents who
2supply sector-speciﬁc experience, while today’s entrants who supply labor determine tomorrow’s stock
of sector-speciﬁc experience.1 Due to this complementarity, the transition to the exclusive use of the
modern sector technology occurs gradually and the speed and the slope of the transition path depend
on the initial distribution of the sector-speciﬁc skills. An implication of the model is that despite a
constant productivity growth in the modern sector, aggregate output can remain stagnant for a long
while and then accelerates before decelerating, generating an S-shaped transition path.
Aggregate output growth in the model is driven by the endogenous evolution of the distribution of
the sector-speciﬁc skills combined with the exogenous productivity growth in the modern sector. The
output growth from the changes in sector-speciﬁc experience would enter into conventional measures
of aggregate TFP growth. In this sense, our model provides a theory of TFP, as posited by Prescott
(1998). The importance of TFP in explaining within-country growth experiences is well documented
by Kehoe and Prescott (2002). Regarding the sources of the TFP, they postulate policy-oriented
conjectures based on informed guesses, concluding that “absent careful micro studies at ﬁrm and
industry levels, we can only conjecture as to what these policies are,” calling for micro evidence. This
paper attempts to provide such micro evidence for the sources of TFP. Obviously, diﬀerences in policy
may explain the diﬀerences in TFP over space and over time. However, before rushing into the policy
discussion, we seek the origin of the TFP diﬀerentials from some fundamental conditions such as
the initial distribution of the sector-speciﬁc skills between modern and traditional sectors. We then
evaluate how far a model with no policy arguments can reach.
Our model of transition also provides a natural framework to analyze inequality dynamics within
countries. After partitioning the economy into traditional and modern sectors, we document systematic
diﬀerences in earnings both across sectors and within sectors, and their evolution over time. Depending
on the distribution of sector-speciﬁc experience, the average earnings gap between the two sectors is
determined. The within-sector experience premium schedules are also determined by the relative
scarcity of sector-speciﬁc skills, hence generating within-sector inequality dynamics as the economy
grows. Thus, our model provides a micro foundation of the growth-inequality nexus, i.e. the well-
known Kuznets curve, postulated in Kuznets (1955).
1Chari and Hopenhayn (1991) consider steady states in an economy with a constant arrival of new technologies
which each require speciﬁc skills. We consider out of steady state dynamics across two technologies where the modern
technology has a constant productivity growth rate. Beaudry and Francois (2004) highlight the existence of multiple
steady states in a two technology economy, when there is no productivity growth in the modern sector.
3We apply our model to explain the aggregate and disaggregate dynamics of labor earnings of
Thailand for the two-decade period between 1976 and 1996. Although our model has implications for
the cross-country income diﬀerences, here we pursue the growth dynamics of a single country for two
reasons. First, the Thai economy experienced rapid growth with enormous structural transformation
in various dimensions. This allows us to observe a wide spectrum of modern transition for the two
decades under consideration. Second, Thailand provides us with a rich set of micro data that can be
used to select the parameter values of the model from an explicit estimation. Some key parameters like
the sector-speciﬁc complementarity between experience and labor have never been directly measured.
Thus, simulating the model with a tight link to the actual data for a single country allows us to
learn about not only the appropriate parameter space for the model, but also how the various general
equilibrium forces of the model work through. This will lay a ﬁrm ground for future analysis of other
countries as well as for future cross-country studies.
We estimate almost all the deep parameters of the model by embedding its structure to the Thai
data from the earnings relationships within each sector. We then simulate the model at the chosen
parameters and compare the simulated dynamics with the actual data. We report on the model success
in explaining the dynamics of (i) aggregate earnings growth, (ii) sectoral transition, (iii) inter-sectoral
earnings inequality, and (iv) intra-sectoral earnings inequality for the Thai economy.
We ﬁnd the model simulates well the aggregate earnings growth path. It captures well the S-
shaped transition of modern labor share. It captures well an overall increasing trend in the earnings
inequality across sectors found in the data. Finally, the observed magnitude of the experience premium
in the modern sector is matched by the model, while a large drop in this premium in the traditional
sector between 1976 and 1996 is also captured.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 describes the data.
Procedure of structural estimation is explained in Section 4. Simulation results are discussed in Section
5. Section 6 concludes.
42M o d e l
Consider a two period overlapping generations economy with constant population.2 Lifetime prefer-
ences are,
u = c1 + βc2,β∈ (0,1) (1)
Since utility is linear in consumption, the equilibrium interest factor is R = 1
β. The lifetime budget
constraint is given by,
c1 + βc2 = y1 + βy2 (2)
Production occurs in two sectors that produce a homogenous good, a traditional sector and a
modern sector. Aggregate output in period t is given by,
˜ Yt = ˜ YTRADITIONAL[G(LT,t,E T,t),K T,t]+˜ YMODERN
h
γt ˜ XF (LM,t,E M,t),K M,t
i
(3)
G(LT,t,E T,t),γtXF (LM,t,E M,t) denote eﬃciency units of labor, and KT,t,K M,t denote physical cap-
ital in the traditional and modern sectors respectively. In each sector, output is constant returns to
scale in both inputs.
When the marginal product of capital is constant R = 1
β, the ratio of capital to eﬃciency units
of labor is constant. The marginal product of an eﬃciency unit of labor in the traditional sector is








Deﬁne X ≡ νM
νT . Then, we can renormalize the measure of output to express aggregate labor earnings
as,3
LYt = G(LT,t,E T,t)+γtXF (LM,t,E M,t) (4)
The eﬃciency units of labor in each sector are a constant returns to scale function of raw labor Lk,t
and sector speciﬁce x p e r i e n c eEk,t,k∈ {T,M}. Deﬁne  T ≡ G(1,0) and  M ≡ F (1,0).
2We generalize the model to s period overlapping generations later in the paper.
3If the capital share is (i) constant and (ii) equal across sectors, the growth of labor income will equal the growth of
per capita income. If the capital share is higher in the modern sector, the growth of labor income will be lower than the
growth of per capita income during the transition period.







The only identifying assumption of the modern sector is that there are sustained exogenous increases
in productivity for that sector only γ>1.4 We assume βγ < 1.5
In a two period overlapping generations economy, the resource constraints are,
LT,t = Mt + λMt−1 (6)
ET,t = λMt−1
LM,t = Nt + λNt−1
EM,t = λNt−1
1=Mt + Nt
λ ∈ (0,1],M −1 ∈ [0,1],N −1 ∈ [0,1] given
Mt−1 denotes the measure of agents in cohort t−1 who entered the traditional sector when they were
born. In period t−1, each of these agents supplies 1 unit of raw labor to traditional sector production.
In period t, each of these agents supplies λ units of raw labor and λ units of experience speciﬁct o
traditional sector production. Nt−1 denotes the measure of agents in cohort t − 1 who entered the
modern sector when they were born. In period t−1, each of these agents supplies 1 unit of raw labor
to modern sector production. In period t, each of these agents supplies λ units of raw labor and λ
units of experience speciﬁc to modern sector production. λ denotes the depreciation factor of both
labor and experience supplied by each worker. The consideration of depreciation does not aﬀect the
qualitative results, but it plays an important role in the quantitative analysis.
The resource constraints can be simpliﬁed to,
LT,t =1 + λ − LM,t =1− Nt + λ(1 − Nt−1)
ET,t = λ − EM,t = λ(1 − Nt−1)
4We think the assumption of exogenous technical progress is appropriate for late industrializing economies who have
access to technologies developed elsewhere by early industrializing economies. In particular, our model does not attempt
to explain the origins of the Industrial Revolution.
5Despite the arrival of new technologies we assume experience is transferable across technologies within the modern
sector. In our empirical work we ﬁnd modern sector production is more intensive in physical and human capital. One
can think of modern experience as being speciﬁc to production with high physical and human capital intensity.







































































































































When there is no sectoral reallocation of workers,


















λ and vice versa.
We assume that the lifetime product of an agent working in the traditional sector is weakly lower
than that in the modern sector when there is no sectoral reallocation of workers. i.e.,











































Note if Condition A is true for t =0 , it is true for ∀t ≥ 0.
We do not model the economy before the "Industrial Revolution". The Industrial Revolution is












































Note this is a suﬃcient for Condition A (7).
2.1 Equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium, in every period t,
(i) every agent earns wages equal to his marginal product,
(ii) new born agents choose which sector to work in for the rest of their lives, and how much to
consume each period to maximize their lifetime utility (1) given the interest factor R,
wages implied by (4), the distribution of labor across sectors in period t,
{Nt,N t−1}, the distribution of labor across sectors in periods t + i, {Nt+i}
∞
i=1 ,
and budget constraint (2),
(iii) the resource constraints (6) are satisﬁed.
In equilibrium, ex ante identical young agents in period t choose with sector to work in for the








































If young agents enter both sectors in period t, Nt ∈ (0,1). Using the resource constraints and the












































Lemma 1 Let T denote the ﬁrst period at which the entire population is working in the modern
sector. Given Nt−1 =1 ,t h e nNt+i =1∀i ≥ 0, and t = T.
Proof in Appendix.
If young agents enter the modern sector only in period t − 1, Nt−1 =1 , u s i n gL e m m a1t h e
8participation constraint is,
g0 (1) + βλ
£

























Equations (10) and (11) characterize a system of diﬀerential equations in Nt of order 2.
Proposition 1 Given the initial state N−1,
(i) there exists a unique equilibrium transition path with T<∞,
(ii) the population of the modern sector never falls Nt−1 ≤ Nt,a n d
(iii) Nt is increasing in N−1, for ∀t ≥ 0,
(iv) T is decreasing in N−1.
Proof in Appendix.
Proposition 1(ii) states that the population of the modern sector is increasing throughout transition,
which implies the population of the traditional sector is always falling. Proposition 1(iii) and 1(iv)
state transition is faster when the share of experienced agents in the modern sector is larger in the
initial period.
In our simulations, we encounter the following outcome: during transition, lifetime incomes are
ﬁrst rising slower than γ, then rising faster than γ. Once transition is complete, lifetime income grows
at rate γ. Thus, the simulated outcomes describe an S-shaped path of lifetime incomes over the time
series. To understand this result intuitively, suppose there is no complementarity in the modern sector
so
∂2F(LM,t,EM,t)
∂LM,t∂EM,t =0 . In this case, the log of lifetime income grows linearly at the steady state rate
γ during and after transition. Next, suppose there is no complementarity in the traditional sector
so
∂2G(LT,t,ET,t)
∂LT,t∂ET,t =0 , which implies lifetime incomes are constant in the traditional sector. In this
case, lifetime incomes are constant up to period T −2, then they converge to the steady state lifetime
income path by period T. In general, when there is complementarity in both sectors, the lifetime
income follows the pattern described above.
Proposition 2 During transition (i.e. for t<T),
(i) If lifetime income is rising: the population of the traditional sector is




(ii) If lifetime income is ﬁrst rising slower than γ, then rising faster than γ:




Nt for all t<Qand Nt
Nt−1 ≥
Nt+1
Nt for all t ≥ Q.
Proof in Appendix.





















When the population growth in either sector is falling, average wages in that sector must be rising.
Thus, from Proposition 2(i), when lifetime income is rising average wages are rising in the traditional
sector. In the modern sector, wages may be rising even when population growth is increasing, since
there is productivity growth through γ>1.
The ratio of experienced worker wages to inexperienced worker wages (i.e. the experience pre-































The experience premium is positively correlated to the population growth rate in each sector.
2.2 Welfare
The allocation of workers across technologies in the competitive equilibrium coincides with the allo-






βtYt s.t. (4) and (6) (12)
Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst order conditions of this problem equal the participation constraints (10) and (11).
Thus, competitive equilibrium outcomes maximize the present discounted value of aggregate output.
102.3 Comparative Statics
Here we demonstrate the qualitative role of initial diﬀerences in the share of experienced labor in the
modern sector (the state variable) on lifetime earnings and average earnings growth. In particular, we
show how this role is aﬀected by the degree of relative complementarity in the modern versus traditional
sectors. In a two period overlapping generations setting, the initial share of modern experience is a
single number rather than a distribution in settings with more than two periods.
The transition dynamics of the model crucially hinge on the sector-speciﬁc complementarity be-
tween labor and experience. To quantify the magnitudes of the complementarity, we parameterize the
sectoral production functions G and F by the following CES forms,


















where ρT < 1, ρM < 1, 0 <α T < 1,a n d0 <α M < 1. The elasticities of substitution between labor
and experience are measured by 1
1−ρT and 1
1−ρM , respectively for traditional and modern sectors. The
lower the values of ρT and ρM, the greater the complementarity between labor and experience. At the
limit value of ρT and ρM at unity, labor and experience are perfect substitutes with relative shares
being governed by the parameters αT and αM alone, and experience premia are measured by (1−αT)
and (1−αM). We may consider the parameters αT and αM as controlling the pure experience premium
in the absence of complementarity.
Assuming people work 40 years, 1 period in our 2 period overlapping generations model corre-
sponds to 20 years. The calibrated parameters are,
Parameter Value Note
β 0.045 ' (0.86)
20 from annual interest rate 16%, within range of Thai data
γ 1.3 ' (1.013)
20 average productivity growth UK, 1900-2000
λ 0.6 ' (0.975)
20 consistent with estimates for Thailand we report
We set modern sector productivity growth equal to aggregate productivity growth in a frontier
economy such as the UK, assuming (i) modern technologies are developed in such frontier economies
and (ii) the UK completed its modern transition before 1900. X is set to satisfy X = XIR from (8),
so the initial period is the Industrial Revolution which we consider to be around 1820.
For this demonstrative exercise, we highlight the role of relative complementarity in the produc-
tion function. In Experiment 1, complementarity is higher in the modern sector. In Experiment 2,
11complementarity is higher in the traditional sector.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Parameter αT αM ρT ρM
Value 0.8 0.8 0.5 -2
αT αM ρT ρM
0.8 0.8 0.5 -2
We ﬁrst report outcomes in Experiment 1. [Figure 6] shows the evolution of lifetime earnings
with diﬀerent initial shares in the modern sector, N−1. [Figure 7] shows the corresponding evolution
of average earnings. Two economies with N−1 =0 .1,N −1 =0 .0001 have negligible diﬀerences in
average earnings at the initial period, but the ﬁrst economy is 10 times richer 100 years later. 100
years later, this economy is 6 times richer than another with N−1 =0 .01. However, 160 years after
the initial period, all economies are equally rich. Meanwhile, the diﬀerence in lifetime earnings is of
lower magnitude, never exceeding 4 for the hypothetical economies considered.
The pattern of divergence then convergence of average earnings relative to the steady state econ-
omy (deﬁned as N−1 =1 )graphed, implies economies which experience a take-oﬀ of average earnings
later, enjoy faster absolute increases in earnings once they take-oﬀ. This pattern of growth is consis-
tent with Parente and Prescott (2000), who document that countries that achieved a certain level of
income ($2000 in 1990 US dollars) later in history, were able to double their income in a far shorter
period than countries that achieved this level of income earlier in history.
Outcomes under Experiment 2 are very diﬀerent. First, the diﬀerence in lifetime incomes is
signiﬁcantly reduced, although the S-shaped pattern of convergence remains, and the order of lifetime
incomes remains the same [Figure 8]. The diﬀerence in earnings is even more dramatic. Under
the parameters used, initial average earnings are lower in the economy with higher N−1 [Figure 9].
Convergence in both lifetime and average earnings occurs more rapidly under Experiment 2.
Since we are not aware of any studies which report the technology parameters for the traditional
and modern sector production functions speciﬁed, we cannot assess the validity of the parameters
{αT,α M} and {ρT,ρ M} used above. We address this key issue for Thailand, in the estimation and
simulation sections of this paper.
122.4 S-period Model
We now consider a general s-period overlapping-generations model for 2 ≤ s<∞, which will be used












The sectoral production functions remain the same as in the two-period model, but the state variable
is now the entire distribution of experience in modern sector over the age cohorts {Nt−i}s−1
i=0, where
Nt−i denotes the measure of agents in with i periods of experience in the modern sector at date t.

















Mt−i =1 − Nt−i, ∀i (19)
The initial condition {N−i}
s−1
i=1 is exogenously given. In period t, each of these agents supplies λi units
of labor and iλi units of experience speciﬁc to traditional sector production, where i ∈ {0,1,...,s− 1}
.I np e r i o dt +1, each of these agents supplies λi+1 units of labor and (i +1 )λi+1 units of experience
speciﬁc to traditional sector production. Nt−i denotes the measure of agents in cohort t−i who entered
the modern sector when they were born. In period t, each of these agents supplies λi unit of labor
and iλi units of experience speciﬁc to modern sector production. In period t+1, each of these agents
6Some of the analytical results only hold for the s =2case above, because of the following reasons: (i) in the two
period case, the labor to experience ratio is equivalent to the population growth rate of each sector, (ii) in the two period
case, the state of the economy given by the distribution of experienced agents across sectors is a single number.
13supplies λi+1 units of labor and (i +1 )λi+1 units of experience speciﬁc to modern sector production.7
In period t, the lifetime earnings of an agent entering the traditional sector or modern sector


































When there is no sectoral reallocation of workers,


















(1 − λs)(1− λ)
λ − λs − (s − 1)λs (1 − λ)
≡ l∗ constant
Since l∗ is the labor-experience ratio when there is no reallocation of workers across the two sectors,
if
LT,t
ET,t <l ∗ ⇒
LM,t
EM,t >l ∗ and vice versa.
Condition A is now replaced by Condition A0,




































In the Appendix, we outline the equilibrium construction procedure for this generalized model.
3D a t a
We use the Thai Socio-Economic Survey (SES), a nationally representative household survey conducted
by the National Statistical Oﬃce for the 1976-1996 period. Eight rounds of repeated cross-sections
were collected for this period (1976, 1981, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1996), using clustered

























Nt−i and Nt−j are complements when [1 − il][1− jl] < 0, and substitutes when [1 − il][1− jl] ≥ 0. Thus, cohorts which
are separated more in time are more likely to be complementary.
14household. The sample size varies depending on the year from 10,897 to 25,208 by households and
45,138 to 93,886 by individuals.
The SES records rich information on income variables and socioeconomic characteristics not only
at the household level but also at the individual level for all household members. Total income is
decomposed into its sources of wage, proﬁts, property income, and transfer income. We convert
the nominal income variables in the data into real terms in 1990 baht value using the CPI indices
diﬀerentiated by ﬁve geographic regions (Bangkok and its Metropolitan vicinity region, Central region,
Northern region, Northeast Region, and South region).
The socioeconomic characteristics of the SES include sex, age, region and community type of res-
idence, years of schooling, occupation, socioeconomic class, working status (employer, self-employed,
employee, family worker, unemployed, or inactive), type of enterprise if running a business, and in-
dustry sector. In particular, types of household enterprises are disaggregated into the two-digit level
and occupational activities into the three-digit level.
[Figure 1] documents how the Thai aggregate labor earnings accelerated during this period, en-
joying a take-oﬀ around the mid-1980s. Using the rich information of individual characteristics from
the SES, we identify traditional and modern sectors as speciﬁed by the model such that only the
modern sector enjoys positive exogenous productivity growth. The detailed procedure of the partition
will be discussed immediately below in the Estimation section. [Figure 2] shows how the share of the
workforce across sectors evolved over the period. Clearly, the period under consideration was one of
gradual but signiﬁcant structural change for the Thai economy.
This partition of the aggregate data yielded a number of systematic inter and intra sectoral
diﬀerences in earnings. [Figure 3] shows how the ratio of modern to traditional average earnings
across sectors evolved over the period. Average earnings is about 1.5 times higher in the modern
sector and there is a slight upward trend during the sample period. [Figure 4] and [Figure 5] show how
the experience-earnings proﬁles for each sector has evolved between 1976 and 1996. It appears that
the experience premium is higher in the traditional sector. In the traditional sector there is a clear
fall in the experience premium between 1976 and 1996, while in the modern sector this is less clear.
154 Estimation
4.1 Sector Partition
The relevant concept of income in the model is earnings rather than all-inclusive income. The disaggre-
gated data of income combined with the individual working status data allow us to sort out the earned
income (i.e. wage income for employed workers and proﬁt income for employers and self-employed
people) from the total income to construct the earnings variable. We include only economically active
people, (neither unemployed nor inactive people according to the work status variable) who indeed
report earnings. People who live only on property income or transfer income are excluded.8
There are two types of heterogeneity in the model, (i) sector type and (ii) experience. Partitioning
the workforce into modern and traditional sectors is a key measurement of the model. However, the
distinction between modern and traditional sectors in the model does not have a direct counterpart
in the data. The concept of being modern or traditional is a theoretical abstraction. We combine the
disaggregated feature of the micro data, with the implications of the model to identify the modern-
tradition partition of the workforce.
Essentially, we follow a guess-and-verify strategy. First, we disaggregate the workforce using
three-digit occupational category data combined with industry sector data, and compute the rates
of change in workforce shares over the two decades for each occupation category. According to the
model, if an occupational category belongs to the modern sector, we expect to observe net entry for
this occupation. The ranking of the occupational categories ordered by the rates of change in workforce
share is positively related with the likelihood of being the modern sector in the model.W e g u e s s a
subset of occupational categories belong to the modern sector when the net entry rate is higher than
some non-negative threshold level.
However, this partition is just an initial guess. The levels and changes in the populations shares
of occupational categories are subject to sampling errors and there is no clear-cut threshold level of
net entry rate to be applied. We are free to change the guessed partition by varying the threshold
level. Thus, we need some verifying device to pin down the sectoral partition. Net entry to the modern
sector is the implication of the model. The fundamental distinction between modern and traditional
sectors in the model comes from the existence of the exogenous productivity growth. If the workforce
8The size of this selected sample is 176,666 individuals including all years.
16is properly partitioned, we would observe positive exogenous growth of earnings over time (which is
related neither to the changes in labor and experience nor to the accumulation of other productive
assets and attributes) only in the modern sector, but not in the traditional sector.
We estimate the within-sector earnings functions as in the model (which are to be speciﬁed in the
following subsection), to verify the existence of the presumed exogenous growth of earnings. If the
estimates of the exogenous growth rates agree with the model, we take the partition in the data as
representing the sector partition in the model. If not, we choose another guess and verify again. This
loop of guess-and-verify is iterated until we ﬁnd a right partition.
The use of disaggregated data by detailed occupational activities is helpful in identifying the
sectors for two reasons. First, this helps grouping people by homogeneous skills and hence the com-
plementarity between labor and experience is well captured using disaggregated data. Second, there
are only two sectors in the model and the model is silent on the compositional changes among the
sub-groups within the modern or traditional sector. It is possible that the compositional changes
among the sub-groups may oﬀset each other if the workforce is grouped too coarsely, and we may not
get informative initial guesses for the modern sector from the ranking of net entry rates.
There are also caveats to using disaggregated data. We may lose consistency in grouping people
in terms of skills used. In the model, the sector-speciﬁcs k i l l sa r ed e ﬁned by technology, not by
occupation. It is possible that, in the data, the workforce share of employees may increase while that
of employers or the self-employed may decrease over time within a sector using the same technology.
The model is silent about this kind of compositional change but we need to categorize both groups of
people into the same sector.
Thus, the exclusive use of net entry rates in disaggregated data may give us a wrong initial guess
for the sector partition. When this kind of disaggregation problem is clear, we re-aggregate them
into the same group. For example, the fastest and largest declining occupational group in Thailand
is rice farmers. So, it is assigned to the traditional sector. However, the workforce share of hired
rice-farm workers increased over time. The net-entry criterion at the initial-guess stage suggests that
the rice-farm workers be assigned to the modern sector but we assign them to the traditional sector
for purposes of consistency. We verify the appropriateness of this partition by observing the estimated
sectoral exogenous growth rates.
In the literature of structural transformation, the typical partitioning characteristics are either
17rural versus urban as in Todaro (1969) and Lucas (2004) or agriculture versus non-agriculture (in
particular manufacturing) as in Kuznets (1966), Hansen and Prescott (2000), and Gollin, Parente and
Rogerson (2004). Our chosen partition of the “modern” sector suggests that this sector does not neces-
sarily correspond to urban areas or manufacturing. “Modernization,” measured by the transition from
the traditional sector to the modern sector, can be diﬀerent from the typical structural transformation
such as urbanization or industrialization although they are correlated.
The modern and traditional sectors coexist in both rural and urban areas. 38% of the urban
population belongs to the traditional sector and 12% of the rural population belongs to the modern
sector. The two sectors coexist in agriculture, manufacturing, and services. The major agricultural
activity in Thailand is rice farming, and most agricultural workers and farmers are included in the
traditional sector. However, 1.3% of the agricultural population like ﬁshermen (shrimp farmers),
non-logging forest workers, dairy and other ﬁeld-crop farmers belong to the modern sector.
38% of manufacturing workers are traditional. These traditional manufacturing workers include
miners, metal rolling mill workers, wood and paper product makers, spinners and weavers, grain
millers, sugar processors and reﬁners, tobacco makers, tailors, blacksmith, rubber product makers, and
printing pressmen. Modern manufacturing workers include construction workers, material handling
and equipment operators, electrical and electronic workers, sheet metal makers, jewelry and precious
metal makers, shoe makers, pattern makers, embroiders, potters, and food and beverage processors
other than grain millers and sugar processors.
79% of service workers are traditional sector. The traditional service workers include self-employed
traders, street and waterway vendors, professional midwives and occupational therapists, cooks and
maids, drivers, primary and secondary school teachers, policemen, and armed forces. Modern service
workers include book-keepers and accountants, communication service workers, technical salesmen,
commercial travel agencies, insurance, real estate, security service salesmen, medical doctors and
nurses, pre-school and university-or-higher level teachers, ﬁremen, mechanics and repairmen, and
dockers and freight handlers. It is interesting to notice that university-or-higher level teachers and pre-
school teachers turn out to be categorized into the modern sector while primary and secondary school
teachers into the traditional sector. Among protective service workers, ﬁremen are categorized into the
modern sector while policemen and armed forces into the traditional sector. Among medical service
workers, doctors and nurses belong to the modern sector while professional midwives and occupational
18therapists to the traditional sector. These examples illustrate that modern and traditional sectors may
coexist even within the same type of industry, in particular among the service workers.
4.2 Earnings Functions
As we introduced earlier, the sectoral production functions G and F are parameterized by the following
CES forms:


















In a typical aggregate production function, raw labor and experience are treated as perfect sub-
stitutes, which is a special limit case of the above CES technology. Specifying the aggregate functions
G and F for eﬀective units of labor by the CES forms, we allow for the possibility of complementarity
between labor and sector-speciﬁc experience and measure the size of the complementarity following
the empirical strategy below.
From the CES speciﬁcation in (23), the traditional sector earnings ˜ wT,jt of an agent with j periods
of experience at date t is given by,
















+ j(1 − αT)
#
(25)
where λT denotes the depreciation rate and γT the exogenous growth rate of productivity in the
traditional sector. Note that the identifying restriction for the traditional sector from the model is
γT =0 . As mentioned above, this is our verifying device in identifying the traditional sector. We allow
γT to be non-zero in our estimation. If the sector partitioning is correct, the estimated γT should be
close to zero.
From the CES speciﬁcation in (24), the modern sector earnings ˜ wM,jt of an agent with j periods
of experience at date t is,
















+ j(1 − αM)
#
(26)
where λM denotes the depreciation rate, γM the exogenous growth rate of productivity, and X the
time-invariant relative productivity in the modern sector. The sectoral labor and experience variables
LT,t,E T,t,L M,t, and EM,t are measured as in equations (15) to (18).
19To minimize omitted-variable bias problems, we allow for exogenous variation in eﬀective units
of productivity zk(χk,it,  k,it) for each sector k ∈ {T,M} when applying the sectoral log-earnings
equations above to the actual data. χk,it denotes the observable productive attributes and  k,it the
unobservable ones of an individual i at date t. Thus, the observed earnings of individual i at date t in
sector k, wk,it is given by,
wk,it = zk(χk,it,  k,it)˜ wk,j(i)t, for k ∈ {T,M}
where j(i) denotes the experience of the individual i. We choose the typical Mincerian regressors such
as years of schooling, gender, community type, and geographic region as a common set of observable
characteristics χit in both sectors. We also assume zk(χk,it,  k,it) to take the exponential form such
that,
zk(χk,it,  k,it)=e x p
£
Akχk,it +  k,it
¤
where  k,it follows a mean-zero i.i.d normal distribution for each sector k ∈ {T,M}.T h i sa l l o w su st o
compare the log-earnings equations from the model with the typical Mincerian earnings regression.
In sum, we estimate the following log-earnings equations for each sector,
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.
t denote years since the initial year 1976. So for instance, t =1 0for 1986.
There are two diﬀerences between the log-earnings equations in (27) and (28) and the standard
Mincerian earnings equations. First, the model shows how the aggregate state variable (the sectoral
labor-experience ratio
Lk,t
Ek,t), as well as the individual characteristics can directly aﬀect individual earn-
ings. Second, the experience variable j enters in a non-polynomial way and the experience premium
is determined conditional on the sectoral labor-experience ratio. In other words, the sectoral labor-
experience ratio determines the market value of sector-speciﬁc experience at the individual level. Note
20that both features directly come from the existence of complementarity. At the limit value of the
complementarity parameters ρT and ρM at unity, the sectoral labor-experience ratio
Lk,t
Ek,t drops from
the sectoral earnings equations (25) and (26).
4.2.1 Identiﬁcation
All the technology parameters {αT,ρ T,α M,ρ M,γM,γT,λ M,λ T,X} are included in the log-earnings
equations (27) and (28). Thus, we can estimate the technology parameters from these sectoral log-
earnings equations without using aggregate dynamics data such as output growth and population
transition. These aggregate dynamics are to be simulated at the parameters estimated from the
individual log-earnings equations.
This estimation strategy has two kinds of merit. First, due to the standard endogeneity bias
problem, the technology parameters cannot be identiﬁed from the aggregate time series relationship
directly using the production functions in (??) and (24). Furthermore, there are no national income
statistics or aggregate time series data to be matched to calibrate the complementarity between labor
and experience. Estimating the parameters from the individual earnings equations faces neither prob-
lem. Using the structural equations (27) and (28) explicitly derived from the model, the fundamental
parameters can be estimated consistently with the economic environment of the model. From the
estimates and their standard errors, explicit estimation helps us to infer a right range of parameter
space, where the model is applicable in explaining a speciﬁc real economy.
Second, by not using the aggregate dynamics data in the parameter selection step, the over-ﬁtting
problem can be avoided when we compare the aggregate dynamics of output growth and sectoral
transition between the model and the data. Thus, we follow the main spirit of calibration: separation
between parameter selection and model evaluation.
Now the issue of identiﬁcation remains for the log-earnings equations (27) and (28). In the
traditional log-earnings equation (27), the terms j lnλT and tlnγT are additively separable and can





























+ j(1 − αT)
#
Note that the experience-earnings proﬁle is time-invariant, and hence (1 − αT) can be identiﬁed from
the cross-sectional variation of experience through the term second term above (at a given date t,
the ﬁrst term is constant). Given αT, the complementarity parameter ρT can be identiﬁed from the
21time-series variation of
LT,t
ET,t from the pooled data over time. Therefore, all the technology parameters
in the traditional sector can be identiﬁed. The same identiﬁcation strategy applies to the modern
sector.
4.3 Estimates
We use the nonlinear-least-squares method to estimate the sectoral log-earnings equations in (27) and
(28). The estimates are reported in [Table 1] and [Table 2], respectively for traditional and modern
sectors, with standard errors in parentheses. The goodness-of-ﬁt in terms of R2, 0.4534 for the modern
sector and 0.3492 for the traditional sector, seems fairly high relative to the typical earnings regressions.
We can conﬁrm that the estimated exogenous growth rate of productivity of the traditional sector γT
is indeed close to zero while that of modern sector γM is substantially higher than zero at 2.2% per
annum. The depreciation factors λT and λM are quite similar between the traditional and modern
sectors.
The estimates of ρT and ρM suggest that the complementarity is strong. In both sectors, labor
and experience are far from perfect substitutes, and the elasticity of substitution is even lower than
in the Cobb-Douglas case. In particular, the complementarity is much higher in the traditional sector
at -4.2433 than in the modern sector at -0.8801. The pure experience premium parameter (1 −αT) is
also higher in the traditional sector than (1−αM) in the modern sector. Thus, experience seems more
valuable in the traditional sector than in the modern sector. However, note that the market reward
to individual experience depends on aggregate state variables, sectoral labor-experience ratios, which
vary over time due to exogenous productivity growth in the modern sector. As more people move to
the modern sector, the experience premium in the traditional sector is eventually supposed to decline.
The estimates for the coeﬃcients of the control variables provide us with further interesting
information. These coeﬃcients can be interpreted as the “prices” of the productive attributes such
as higher schooling, being male, or living in better endowed regions. The rates of return to schooling
seem fairly high in both sectors, 12.8 percent for the modern sector and 14.3 percent for the traditional
sector. Another interesting observation is that the prices are uniformly higher in the traditional sector
than in the modern sector for all characteristics.
Table 1. Estimates for Technology Parameters
22Sector αM,α T ρM,ρ T γM,γT λM,λ T R2 RMSE #Obs.
Modern 0.0921 -1.0101 0.0233 0.9536 0.4533 0.7698 38,847
(0.0337) (0.2406) (0.0008) (0.0013)
Traditional 0.0002 -3.8786 -0.0011 0.9626 0.3487 0.9642 137,819
(0.0001) (0.2835) (0.0005) (0.0008)
Table 2. Estimates for Control Variables
Sector Schooling Male Urban North Central South Bangkok
Modern 0.1281 0.3012 0.2132 0.0686 0.3232 0.2297 0.6275
(0.0010) (0.0083) (0.0104) (0.0147) (0.0138) (0.0163) (0.0141)
Traditional 0.1431 0.4700 0.5826 0.1076 0.4432 0.4795 0.7788
(0.0009) (0.0055) (0.0093) (0.0071) (0.0075) (0.0087) (0.0109)
5 Simulation
We take s =2 0to match the estimated parameters with the simulation, so each period lasts 2
years. We set calender year 1976 as t =0in the model. The state of the Thai economy in 1976 is
{NDATA,i}
1974
i=1938 : the share of cohort entry into the modern sector before 1976.
Table 3. State of Thai economy in 1976
N1938 N1940 N1942 N1944 N1946 N1948 N1950 N1952 N1954 N1956
0.032 0.039 0.045 0.051 0.057 0.063 0.07 0.077 0.084 0.091
N1958 N1960 N1962 N1964 N1966 N1968 N1970 N1972 N1974 N1976
0.099 0.107 0.116 0.126 0.137 0.148 0.161 0.176 0.191 0.24
From the estimation, we take 7 parameters of the model {αT,α T,ρ T,ρ M,λ T,λ M,γM}, and set
γT =0 . We take β = 1
R from Thai data on interest rates. [Figure 10] shows that over the sample
period, the Thai commercial bank lending rate has ﬂuctuated between 11% and 17% with an average




Using these estimates we calibrate X1976 to match the simulated ˆ N1976 to the actual N1976. The
standard errors of the estimates guide us in ﬁnding an appropriate parameter space.
Since we do not have panel data we cannot directly conﬁrm the model prediction that entrants
into each sector remain in that sector for the rest of their lives. [Figure 11] provides some indirect
evidence. Displayed are the shares of workers across experience groups measured at diﬀerent years.
When there is no substantial entry/exit across sectors by experienced workers, we should observe an
exact overlap across years. The data suggest they are indeed very close.
23[Figure 12] shows that labor market participation in the Thai economy is stable between the
experience years 0-20. Then participation falls monotonically to about 50% of its peak value for the
40 year experience group. We incorporate this demographic structure of labor market participation
into the simulation, by assuming the participation rate is constant between the 0-20 year experience
group, then assuming the participation rate falls linearly to 50% for the 40 year experience group.
5.1 Simulation Results
Given the calibrated X1976, initial distribution and the estimated parameters, the result of the sim-






: the simulated cohort shares and the ﬁrst period of full cohort
entry into the modern sector. When appropriate, the simulation results are compared with data which
ﬁlter out the eﬀect of the control variables {schooling, gender, community type, geographic region}.
W er e f e rt os u c hd a t aa s" ﬁltered-data".
Average labor earnings dynamics. The ﬁltered earnings data displays the similar acceleration as
in the raw earnings data [Figure 13] . The model does not predict as pronounced an acceleration in
earnings as in the ﬁltered data, but we cannot rule out the possibility that the data displays cyclical
ﬂuctuations around the predicted path of the model.
[Figure 14] compares the simulated path of average earnings in the modern and traditional sectors
versus overall average earnings. Note that average earnings are initially lower in the modern sector.
As the economy undertakes compositional change from the traditional to modern sector, the overall
earnings displays a S-shaped path. Eventually, the overall earnings path will converge to that of a full
transition economy displayed in the same Figure.
The lower average earnings in the economy with completed transition does not imply welfare is
lower in that economy. The correct measure of welfare in the context of the model is lifetime earnings.
[Figure 15] compares lifetime earnings in the simulated Thai economy versus that for an economy with
completed transition. A necessary condition for transition to the modern sector is lifetime incomes
are higher in an economy where everyone is working in the modern sector, and this is shown in the
Figure.
Transition of the labor force. The model simulates cohort entry into the modern sector from
1976 onwards. The simulation overpredicts entry into the modern sector [Figure 16]. The ﬁrst year at
which the entire cohort is predicted to enter the modern sector is T = 2000. [Figure 17] shows how the
24model generates an S-shaped transition of labor share in the modern sector. Since, the simulations
overpredict entry into the modern sector, the simulated labor share is higher than in the data.
Inter-industry earnings inequality. [Figure 18] compares the model outcomes with data for the
ratio of modern average earnings over traditional average earnings. The ﬁltered-data displays signiﬁ-
cantly less inter-sectoral earnings inequality than in the raw data. [Figure 18] compares the dynamics
of the ratio of modern to traditional average earnings in the model to 2 benchmarks from the ﬁltered-
data. "Filtered-data1" is the data assuming no diﬀerence in the earnings coeﬃcients for the dummy
control group. "Filtered-data2" is the ﬁltered-data imposing X =1 . Since the simulated ratio is al-
ways above "Filtered-data2", the calibrated X is consistent with the estimation iﬀ it is greater than
1. The calibrated X =1 .34. Comparing the three time series, the model captures well the upward
trend in inter-sectoral inequality during the sample period, and predicts an accelerated increase in this
inequality.
Intra-industry earnings inequality. [Figure 19] shows the model overpredicts the level of labor-
experience in the modern sector and underpredicts it in the traditional sector. In the simulation the
labor-experience ratio peaks around 1986, while the data also displays a trend of peaking but at a
later period of 1990. In the traditional sector, the labor-experience ratio is monotonically falling in
the model, but this is less evident in the data.




the experience-earnings proﬁle in the model. [Figure 20] and [Figure 21] plot experience-earnings
proﬁles in 1976 and 1996 for each sector. The wage of individuals with zero experience is normalized
to 1.
A remarkable observation from the actual data is how in both sectors and in both periods the
experience premium gets magniﬁed in the ﬁltered-data. Much of this comes from the fact that younger
agents acquire more schooling than older agents. In ﬁltered-data, the experience earnings proﬁle is
steeper in the modern sector, whereas in the raw data it was steeper in the traditional sector. In the
model, the modern sector experience premium is higher in 1996 than in 1976, while in the ﬁltered-data
the opposite appears to be the case. The change in the experience premium from 1976 to 1996 is much
more pronounced in the traditional sector, where the model correctly predicts a fall in the experience
premium, although the model overpredicts this fall.
256C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has shown how incorporating sector speciﬁc experience is important in understanding
earnings levels and inequality dynamics in transition economies. We ﬁnd the model simulates well the
aggregate earnings growth path. It captures well the S-shaped transition of modern labor share. It
captures well an overall increasing trend in the earnings inequality across sectors found in the data.
Finally, the observed magnitude of the experience premium in the modern sector is matched by the
model, while a large drop in this premium in the traditional sector between 1976 and 1996 is also
captured.
An overall lesson is the ﬁnding of complementarity between young and old workers, which diﬀers
across sectors. This can provide a source of measured TFP and inequality dynamics.
A remaining issue in the analysis is how the growth of earnings in the data and model since the
1980s can be reconciled with the growth of Thai per capita incomes since the 1950s (see Maddison,
2001). Earnings and per capita income diﬀer because of physical capital. In particular, if the physical
capital share of output is higher in the modern sector, the model predicts that during transition, per
capita income growth is faster than per capita earnings growth. This hypothesis is worth exploring
further.
The current model assumes experience cannot be transferred across generations within family
dynasties. Since earnings proﬁles are typically steeper in the modern sector, the longer time horizon
in making sectoral entry decision would slow down the transition toward the modern sector. Currently,
the model overpredicts the speed of transition toward the modern sector.
Finally, future work should look at more countries with nationally representative micro data as
used here.
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27AP r o o f s
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . Suppose not so, Nt−1 =1and Nt < 1. From (9), Nt−1 =1implies,
g0 (1) + βλ
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Nt < 1 implies,
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f0 (1) + π(1)
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f0 (1) + π(1)
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Since f0 (x)+βλγ[f0 (x)+π (x)] is falling in x for x<1+1
λ.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . The algorithm for constructing the equilibrium transition path is as
follows:
Step 1: Given N−1,g u e s st h a tNt =1for ∀t ≥ 0. Verify if N0 =1by checking (11) for T =1 .I f
the inequality holds T =1 . If the inequality doesn’t hold, T>1 go to step 2.


































N0 > 1, from (7) we must have N0
N−1 > 1 ⇒ 1−N0
1−N−1 < 1. T h el e f th a n ds i d eo ft h i se q u a t i o ni s
rising in N0, and the right hand side is falling in N0. Given T>1, there exists a unique N0 ∈ (0,1)
which solves this equality. Verify if N1 =1by checking (11) for T =2 . If the inequality holds, T =2 .
If the inequality doesn’t hold T>2 go to step 3.












































































N1 > 1, f r o m( 7 )w em u s th a v eN1
N0 > 1 ⇒ N0
N−1 > 1 using (11) again. In the ﬁrst equation, given
N1 ∈ (0,1), there exists a unique N0 ∈ (0,1) which solves the equality. In the second equation, given
N0 ∈ (0,1), there exists a unique N1 ∈ (0,1) solving the equation. Verify if N2 =1by checking (11)
for T =3 . If the inequality holds T =3 , if the inequality doesn’t hold T>3 go to step 4, and so on.
This procedure identiﬁes an equilibrium with the lowest T.N e x tw es h o wg i v e ns u c ha ne q u i l i b r i u m
there cannot exist another equilibrium with higher T0 >T .Suppose not so, given an equilibrium



























NT−2 by induction using the participation constraints.




N−1. We know from the condition
for T of the original equilibrium, N0
T−1 <N T−1 ⇒ N0
T−2 <N T−2 and so on until N0
0 <N 0 which is a
contradiction.
To complete the proof for uniqueness an equilibrium {N0,...,N T−1} must be unique given T.
Suppose not so that there exists a N0
t 6= Nt for some t ∈ {0,...,T − 1}. The participation constraints
imply that N0
T−1 6= NT−1, so we just need to show that N0
T−1 6= NT−1 leads to contradiction. Suppose
N0






0 <N 0 given
N−1 ⇒ N0
t <N t and N0
T−1 <N T−1 which is a contradiction. Suppose N0
T−1 <N T−1, now to ensure






0 >N 0 given N−1 ⇒ N0
t >N t and N0
T−1 >N T−1
which is a contradiction.
Parts (iii) and (iv) are straightforward from participation constraints and condition (11) for T.

















































g0 (1) + φ(1)
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1−NT−1




1−NT−2 since g0(·) is decreasing and φ(·) is increasing, and so on by iteration.


















































































For t ≥ S,
Nt+1
Nt < Nt
Nt−1 by an argument resembling that used in part (i). Thus, Q<S .



















































































NQ−2, from the equation above and so on by induction.






























. So between period T − 1 and T,
lifetime income is growing faster than γ, and after period T, it grows at rate γ. Thus, Q<S≤ T −1.
There are three possibilities for the path of
Nt+1
Nt : (i) it is rising until t = T − 1 and Q = T − 1,
(ii) it is falling and Q =1 , and (iii) it is rising and then falling. Thus, the population growth of the
modern sector is single peaked.
A.1 Equilibrium for S-period Model
In a competitive equilibrium, in every period t,
(i) every agent earns wages equal to his marginal product,
(ii) new born agents choose which sector to work in for the rest of their lives, and how much to
consume each period to maximize their lifetime utility (13) given the interest factor R,

















j ∈ {1,...,s− 1}, and budget constraint (14),















i=1 j ≥ 1
(iv) the resource constraints (15)-(19) are satisﬁed.
In equilibrium, ex ante identical young agents in period t choose with sector to work in for the








































30If young agents enter both sectors in period t, Nt ∈ (0,1). Using the resource constraints and the





















































Lemma A1 Let T denote the ﬁrst period at which the entire population is working in the
modern sector. Given Nt−(s−1) =1through to Nt−1 =1 ,t h e nNt+j =1∀j ≥ 0, and t = T.




























1−λ + λs−1 (Nt−s − 1)
λ−λs
1−λ −(s−1)λs

















>l ∗, this condition implies























The left hand side denotes the lifetime product of an agent working alone in the traditional sector. In
this case, the traditional sector labor experience ratio is simply given by 1
j. Note g0 (∞) denotes the
marginal product of labor in the absence of experience.
Since γ>1, if this condition is satisﬁed for Nt =1 , it must be satisﬁed for Nt+j =1∀j ≥ 1.





















































In the s =2model there was a single terminal vintage condition. In the general model, there are
(s − 1) terminal vintage conditions. (30) and (31) characterize a system of diﬀerential equations in Nt
of order 2(s − 1).
Proposition A1: Equilibrium construction
Since γ>1, and the lifetime product of agents working in the traditional sector is always ﬁnite,
there exists a ﬁnite terminal period T<∞ for which transition is complete. That is, there exists a
T<∞ for which the inequality (31) holds for NT−(s−1) =1through to NT−1 =1 .
31The algorithm for constructing the equilibrium transition path is as follows:
Step 1:I fN−1 < 1,T≥ s − 1.T= s − 1 occurs if Nt =1∀t ≥ 0. Given {N−i}
s−1
i=1 , guess that
Nt =1∀t ≥ 0.
Verify this by checking whether inequality (31) holds for N0 =1through to Ns−2 =1 . If these
inequalities hold T = s − 1. If they do not all hold, T>s− 1 go to step 2.
Step 2:G i v e n{N−i}
s−1
i=1 , guess that Nt =1∀t ≥ 1. Then determine N0 ∈ (0,1) using participa-
tion constraint (30). The left hand side of this participation constraint is rising in N0, and the right
hand side is falling in N0. Given T>s −1, there exists a unique N0 ∈ (0,1) which solves this equality.
Verify if Nt =1∀t ≥ 1 by checking whether inequality (31) holds for N1 =1through to Ns−1 =1 .
If these inequalities hold T = s. If they do not all hold, T>sgo to step 3.
Step 3:G i v e n{N−i}
s−1
i=1 , guess that Nt =1∀t ≥ 2. Then determine N1 ∈ (0,1) using participa-
tion constraint (30), and N0 using participation constraints (30) and (31).
Verify if Nt =1∀t ≥ 2 by checking whether inequality (31) holds for N2 =1through to Ns =1 .
If these inequalities hold T = s +1 . If they do not all hold, T>s+1go to step 4, and so on.
320.8
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Figure 21: Traditional experience-earnings proﬁle: 1976, 1996
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